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Third-Party Plaintiffs, ThirdParty Counter-Defendants and
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0. B. OBERHANSLY, LESTER CLAN
STILSON, U:--!I TED FARM AGENCY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants,
Counter-Claimants, FourthParty Plaintiffs, and Respondents,
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CARL C. DUG~~ and LOUISE DUGAN
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Fourth-Party Defendants and
Respondents.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants
Cross-Defendants and Respondents,
vs.

, LUTHER EUGENE JONES and BETTY
' ELVIRA JONES, husband and wife,
Defendants, Counter-Claimants,:
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ThirdParty Counter-Defendants and
Appellants,
Case No. 11656
vs.

0. B. OBERHANSLY, LESTER CLAN
STILSON, UNITED FARM AGENCY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants,
Counter-Claimants, FourthParty Plaintiffs, and Respondents,
vs.

CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN
husband and wife,
Fourth-Party Defendants and
Respondents.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
~ATURE

OF THE CASE

This is a foreclosure action in which a counter-claim and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
third-party
claims
for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of duty
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and negligence were brought by the Appellants.

The action arose

out of the sale, pursuant to a mortgage and trust deed, of real
property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried, without a jury, before Fourth District
Judge J. Robert Bullock.

The court ordered foreclosure of the

plaintiff-respondents' mortgage and denied the defendant,

counte~

claimant, third-party plaintiffs-appellants any relief on their
causes of action sounding in fraud, misrepresentation, breach of
duty and negligence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek a reversal of the order of foreclosure n
a judgment for appellants on their claims for relief.

In the

alternative, the appellants seek a remand to the District Court fu
a jury trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal arises out of certain real estate transactions
involving Carl C. and Louise Dugan, the plaintiffs, counterclaim
defendants and respondents and Betty and Luther Jones the defen·
dants, counterclaimants, third-party plaintiffs and appellants.
B. Oberhansly, Lester Clan Stilson and United Farm Agency are the
third-party defendants and respondents.

-2- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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se

In February, 1972 Oberhansly entered into a listing agreement
with Carl C. Dugan for property owned by the Dugans located in
Jensen, Utah.

This listing specified that the property consisted

of 22 3/4 acres, 18 acres of which were tillable.

Twelve (12)

acres were specified as being pasture and 8 acres were listed as

:t

being irrigated.
In early 1973, the Joneses resided in Morgan Hills, Cali-

~er·

fornia. (Tr. 98)

They obtained a copy of the Spring 1973 United

Farm Agency Real Estate Catalog. (Tr. 100)

Jf

Contained in this

catalog was an advertisement for the property listed by the
The property was advertised as having 22 acres, 18

~gans.

an. tillable, and 8 irrigated, having 1/4 mile river frontage.

Ex. 9)

In reliance on this advertisement the Joneses contacted

~erhansly

fu

(Pl.

in January, 1973 and subsequently travelled from their

home in California to meet with Oberhansly.

(Tr. 103)

Oberhansly

showed them the property and reiterated the substance of the
advertisement in the catalog and listing.

I

m

In reliance on Mr.

Oberhansly's representations, the Joneses made an offer to purchase
the property and executed a Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale

o.

he

(Def. Ex. 5)

which was later signed by the Dugans and by the

Joneses. (Tr. lll-113)

This document stated the amount of

property as 22 3/4 acres.

(Tr. lll-112)

At the time of the execution of the Deposit Receipt and
~reement

of Sale, the Joneses verbally expressed to Oberhansly a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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condition that the sellers either release from the mortgage a
parcel large enough for the Joneses to erect a new home or subordinate their mortgage on a parcel of the land in order for the
Joneses to secure financing for the construction of a new home.
Oberhansly confirmed the Dugans' agreement to this verbal
by a letter to the Joneses.

(Tr. 115, 116)

condit~

(Def. Ex. 11)

Pursuant to the terms of the Deposit Receipt and Agreement

~

Sale, the Dugans tendered a warranty deed which did not state the 1
number of acres of land being conveyed to the Joneses.

''

The war- '

ranty deed, in fact, conveyed a parcel of real property containi~~l
less than seven acres rather than 22 3/4 acres as set forth in
Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale.

(De£. Ex. 10)

t~

I

(Tr. 95)

The Joneses, in reliance on the representations of the Dugans and!
Oberhansly as to the size of the parcel of property conveyed,
executed a mortgage and promissory note.

(Tr. 124)

The Joneses

took possession of the property unaware of the missing acreage. t
approximately May, 1974, after making a deposit on a pre-fabricatecl
home of $500.00, (Def. Ex. 14)

the Joneses learned that no parcel

of land had been released by the Dugans and that Oberhansly's
statement in his letter was false.

(Tr. 123)

Because of this non·'!
.. 1

release, the Joneses were prevented from purchasing or cons tructln'l

I

a new dwelling on this property.
The Joneses had told the Dugans and Oberhansly that their
reason for purchasing said property was for the construction of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-4Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

campground.

(Tr. 105-106)

In September, 1976, after having the

~-

appropriate individuals inspect the property for a campground

:he

franchise, the Joneses learned of the large discrepency in the
acreage (less than seven acres instead of 22 3/4 acres).

(Tr. 133)

They contacted legal counsel who wrote a letter to the Dugans

it~

advising them that due to the discrepency the payments would be
paid into an escrow account until the acreage discrepency could be

t oi

the

straightened out.

1

''

r-

(Tr. 138)

On January 19, 1977, the Dugans filed an action to foreclose

'

on the property sold to the Joneses.

ningll

(R. 1)

The Joneses answered

the Dugans' complaint and filed a counterclaim against the

the

Dugans and a third-party complaint against United Farm Agency,

: .• I Stilson and Oberhansly.

The counterclaim and third-party complaint

alleged, in part, causes of action for fraud, misrepresentation,
breach of duty, and negligence.

ls

(R. 15- 31)

POINT I.

1:

APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE A JURY
DETERMINE THE FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED IN
THEIR CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE, MISREPRESENTATION AND BREACH OF
DUTY.

:a tee\
·eel

non·\,
. I

tlnil

I

I
1

On September 15, 1978, the appellants made a demand for a jury
trial. (R.l56,157)

The third-party defendants objected to the

demand for jury trial on the grounds that the issues in the case
were primarily equitable.

(R.l58,159)

The Fourth District Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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declined to grant a trial by jury.

The court cited State Bank

of Lehi vs. Woolsey, 565 P.Zd 413 (Utah 1977) as authority for
its decision.

(R.l61)

The Constitution of Utah Article I, Section 10, declares
that "a jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded".
Utah Code Annotated section 78-21-1 (1953) allows a right to jury
trial as follows:
In actions for the recovery of specific
real or personal property, with or without
damages, or for money claimed as due
upon a contract, or as damages for breach
of contract, or for injuries, an issue
of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a
jury trial is waived or a reference is
ordered.
The Joneses made no waiver of a jury trial and the court
ordered no reference.

The appellants, therefore, met the statu-

tory requirements for a jury trial.
The difference between State Bank of Lehi, supra., and the
case at bar is in the relief prayed for by the respective defendants.

In State Bank of Lehi, the defendants requested relief

w~

based on the security interest being foreclosed on by the plaintiffs.

In the present case, the Joneses are not asserting that

the foreclosure or the defenses raised in opposition to the foreclosure are questions for a jury.

However, the factual issues

raised by the causes of action alleging fraud, negligence, misrepresentation and breach of duty are questions for a jury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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These;

questions of fact, independent of the validity of the interest
being foreclosed on, should have been submitted to a jury.

These

questions clearly distinquish the case at bar from State Bank
of Lehi.
The fact that a case involves equitable issues does not prevent a jury from determining the legal issues of fact.

ny

The United

States Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. vs. Westover, 79
S.Ct. 948, 359 U.S. 500, 3 L.Ed. 2d 988, (1959) in addressing the importance of scrutinizing the denial of right to a jury trial stated
in a quotation from a previous case:
'Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding
body is of such importance and occupies so firm
a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.'
Dimich v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486, 55 S.Ct.
296, 301, 79 L.Ed 603.

1-

It

does not matter that the Dugans sued for foreclosure first.

The

court in Beacon, supra., stated:
It follows that if Beacon would have been
entitled to a jury trial in a treble
damage suit against Fox it cannot be deprived of that right merely because Fox
took advantage of the availability of
declaratory relief to sue Beacon first.

was

Later in Dairy Queen, Inc. vs. Wood 369 U.S. 467, 472 (1962),

e-

, 82 S.Ct. 894, the court held:

ese ,
- 7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the outset, we may dispose of one of
the grounds upon which the trial court acted in
striking the demand for trial by jury -- that
based upon the view that the right to trial by
jury may be lost as to legal issues where those
issues are characterized as 'incidental' to
equitable issues.
The procedure rules the court used as their reasons for determinin:

1

Dairy Queen, supra, and Beacon are virtually identical to Utah's.
In Hightower vs. Bigoney, 156 So. Zd 501 (Florida 1963), under
similar facts, the Florida Supreme Court observed that the defen·!
dant to a foreclosure action who had counterclaimed for negligen~

1

I

had stated a clear case for a common-law action.

They noted thatci

l

federal and state constitutions guaranteed a right to a trial by a 1
jury in such cases and held that the filing of a compulsory counte1
claim for relief cognizable at law in an action for equitable relie
did not constitute a waiver to the right to a jury trial.
Beacon, Dairy Queen, Hightower, the Constitution of Utah and
Utah Code Annotated 78-21-1 (1953) all provide for a jury trial
under the circumstances of the present case.

Neither a predominan:t

issue test nor a first action filed test applies to determining
whether a jury trial is required.

A party is entitled to a jury

i

to decide factual questions arising out of claims or defenses his-'
torically being issues of law.

The appellants should have been

I
I

granted a jury trial on the factual issues raised by the claims fo:
I

fraud, misrepresentation and breach of duty.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II.
THE APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED
TO CALL EXPERT WITNESSES AT TRIAL TO
AID THE TRIER OF FACT IN THE DETERMINATION
OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
On January 24,

197~

a pre-trial was held where extensive

nin:, discussion among the three attorneys took place.

During this

s.

discussion a disclosure of the appellants' experts fifteen (15)

.nde;

days prior to trial was requested and ordered as part of the pre-

n· \ trial order.
n~

1

was this required disclosure made a part of the court's minute

atci entry.
y a

No written pre-trial order was ever prepared nor

'i

1978.

1

ntei

The trial in this matter did not occur until December 5,
Due to failure to reduce the order to writing and the

long delay between the pre-trial and the trial, the appellants did

elie not disclose their experts.

No further oral or written communi-

cation regarding this requirement took place after the oral
statements of January 24, 1978, until trial.

~

At trial, the court

granted a motion by the third-party defendants-respondents' counsel,
nan:[ to deny the appellants the right to call experts to testify as to
the amount of damages.
Rules 7(b)(2) and (4) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

y

is-

!

I

I

fo:
I

state:
(2) Orders. An order includes every
direction of the court including a minute
order made and entered in writing and
not included in a judgment. An order
for the payment of money may be enforced
by execution in the same manner as if it
were a judgment. Except as otherwise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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specifically provided by these rules,
any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified
without notice by the judge who made it,
or may be vacated or modified on notice.

* * *
(4) Application of Rules to Motions, Orders,
and Other Papers. The rules applicable to
captions, signing, and other matters of form
of pleadings apply to all motions, orders,
and other papers provided for by these rules.
It would appear that an order to be an order must comply
with this section which requires that it be in writing.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rul~

In the

7 there is no separate

delineation of order in the heading or body of the rule.
not specifically mentioned as it is in the Utah rules.

It is
This

suggests that the Utah framers in making this addition specifically meant for orders to be in writing.

Of note is that

agreements which are not to be performed within a year are
required by the Statute of Frauds, UCA 25-5-4, to be void unless
in writing.

Here the time involved was almost one year from pre-

trial to trial.

The reason for this rule was, of course, the

protection from the dangers of a fading memory.
Rule 16(5) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. The court shall make an
order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the plead-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ings, and the agreements made by the parties
as to any of the matters considered, and which
limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.
. (Emphasis added.)
In formulation of this rule controlling the course of the
action, it was acknowledged the need for it to be modified at
trial to prevent manifest injustice.

The court's Finding of

Facts and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 12, states:
12. There was no competent evidence introduced from which the Court could award more
than nominal damages to the third-party
Plaintiff and the Court finds that the proper
measure of damages is the difference between
the value of the property if it had been as
represented and its actual value.
The Joneses' testimony as to the difference in value of the
property as represented and actually received (Tr. 135) as shown
by this paragraph given was completely discounted.

This demon-

strates that the court required expert testimony as to the amount
of damages, yet would not allow it to be given.

This allowance

of the oral pre-trial order to control was a manifest injustice.

In Soliz vs. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11,13, 395 P.2d 25 (1964)
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of rebuttal testimony.
There they said:
The party who has the affirmative burden
of proof is required to produce the first

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence on an issue, and at that time should
produce all his evidence in chief. Then after
his adversary has produced all his evidence, the
former should be confined to rebuttal evidence
or evidence which tends to answer or explain
his adversary's evidence.
Assuming arguendo that the oral pre-trial order was valid, the·
the Joneses properly introduced all the allowable evidence concern;·/
the value of the building in question.
The purpose of the pre-trial order was to prevent the

opposi~!

parties from being unable to offer testimony in opposition to that
testimony offered by expert witnesses.

This purpose lost its
1

importance when the Dugans admitted testinony on the value of the
building.

The Joneses attempted to offer rebuttal testimony by

Mr. Carroll.

The court disallowed this testimony, thereby depriving

the Joneses of their rights to offer rebuttal testimony as required by Soliz.
There the appellants contended that the trial court erred in
failing to limit the testimony to a rebuttal of evidence introducei
on behalf of the respondent.

In the case at bar the court never

allowed the rebuttal testimony.
The disparity in the value of the building was a critical
issue at trial.

(Tr. 135, 246)

A denial by the court to hear

testimony intended to answer evidence presented by the Dugans was
prejudicial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III.
THE APPELLANTS AND PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE
COHPETENT WITNESSES TO TESTIFY AS TO THE VALUE
OF THEIR PROPERTY.
There is no question that Utah allows owners of property to
testify as competent witnesses to the value of their real property.
In State of Utah vs. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 186, 478 P.2d
507 (1970), the court stated:
Hr. Dillree being an owner of the property, together with his wife, was a
competent witness as to the value of
the property taken and as to severance
damages incurred.
In Provo River Water Users' Assn. vs. Carlson, 103 Utah 93,
l 04 , 13 3 P . 2d 1 7 7 7 ( 19 4 3) the court said :
As to the qualifications of defendant
Carlson, there is no merit to the
contention that he was not competent
to give an opinion as to value of his
property. An owner of property is always entitled to testify as to its
value, and to express an opinion as to
its value in condemnation proceedings.
An owner does not have to qualify as
an expert, nor be engaged in buying and
selling real estate.
See also State of Utah vs. Woolley, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390

P.Zd 860 (1964); Utah State Road Commission vs. Steele Rand, 533 P.2d
838 (1975); Williams vs. Oldroyd, 581 P.Zd 561 Utah (1978); and
~derson

1

vs. State Farm Fire

& Casualty,

583 P.2d 101, Utah (1978).

Both the appellants and plaintiff-respondents presented evidence as to
the value of the buildings and property.

(Tr. 135,246)

This
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evidence, according to the cases cited above, constituted competent
evidence.
Betty Jones, in testifying as to the value of the buildings
and property, relied on the opinion of Howard Carroll, an appraiser;
the opinion of other real estate professionals; and Mrs. Jones'
knowledge of property values.
was not clearly established.

The basis of Mr. Dugan's testimony
However, Mr. Dugan's testimony

(the value of the land being $10,000), when reduced to a per acre
value, is that the land is worth approximately $1,600 per acre.
value is very close to the value testified to by Mrs. Jones.

Thi!

The

court should have given considerable weight to the testimony of Mrs.
Jones and Mr. Dugan as to the value of the land.

In short, with-

out any additional evidence being received, there was competent
evidence of the value of the property.
POINT IV.
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS OWED A DUTY TO THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS WHICH WAS BREACHED AND RESULTED IN
DAMAGES TO THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS.
The laws of the State of Utah create a monopoly for brokers
and salesmen of real estate by requiring that a license be obtained
from the Securities Commission.

Section 61-2-1 of the Utah Code

Annotated, (1953), as amended provides:
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It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
to engage in the business, act in the
capacity of, advertise or assume to act
as a real estate broker or a real estate
salesman within this state without
first obtaining a license under the
provisions of this chapter.
The Statute also provides the criteria that must be considered
before any person can obtain a license.

Section 61-2-6(a),UCA,

(1953), as amended, states:
It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Board of Real Estate
Examiners to determine the qualifications and requirements and to prescribe the type and content of the
examination to be passed by every
applicant for a real estate broker's
or salesman's license. With due
regard for the paramount interest
of the public, the Board of Real Estate Examiners may require and pass
upon such proof as may be deemed
necessary to determine the honesty,
integrity, truthfulness, reputation,
and competency of each applicant.
(Emphasis added.)
Further stating in Section b:
Such application shall be accompanied by the recommendation
of at least three citizens who
have been for three years and are
now real property owners . . .
certifying that the applicant
bears a good reputation for honesty
and trustworthiness.
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It is clear from the foregoing Statutes that the purpose of
the licensing Board is to determine, in regards to the paramount
interest of the public, the competency, honesty, and integrity of
each real estate broker or salesman so that the public, in general, can rely on that determination.

It is also exceedingly

clear that a person obtaining a broker's or salesman's license
must continue to exemplify these virtues of competency, honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness.

Each member of the public relies

on the fact that he has a license and is trained to deal in real
estate.
Section 61-2-11(7) UCA (1953), as amended, gives the Securities
Commission the authority to revoke real estate licenses if the
licensee violates the duty owed to the public.

This duty is

emphasized when the brokers have greater experience in land
dealings and the purchasers place confidence in their representation,
In Lewis vs. White, 2 Utah 2d, 101, 296 P.2d 865, (1954), the
Court stated:
.On the other hand, the wide difference
in experience and business acumen, and
the degree to which Mrs. White placed
confidence in Mr. Lewis and relied upon
his representations are things which the
jury could take into consideration on
the question of fraud.
. 2 U.2d at 103.
TUtah law, therefore creates a duty owing from any salesman
or broker to the public who deal with such broker or salesman.
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Each member of the public when dealing with a salesman or broker
relies on the fact that each salesman or broker is licensed and
as such, is qualified to serve them competently and adequately.
The broker or salesman is estopped from denying any such duty.
Many jurisdictions recognize a duty running from the salesman and broker to the purchaser.

In Zichlin vs. Dill et ex., 25

So. 2d 4 (1946), the Florida Supreme Court in a case similar to
the one at bar, held that a broker owes a duty to the buyer as
well as his principal.

In that case the brokers were required,

by statutes similar to Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-1 et. seq., to have

a license before engaging in the real estate business.

In strik-

ies

ing down the rule of caveat emptor, the Court stated:

ion,

The broker in this state belongs to a
privileged class and enjoys a monopoly
to engage in a lucrative business. See
section 475.01 et seq. Fla. Stat. 41. F.S.A.
The statute requr~es that (475.17):
'
.All applicants who are natural persons shall be competent, honest, truthful,
trustworthy, of good character and bear
a reputation for fair dealing, . . . ' The
state, therefore has prescribed a high
standard of qualifications and by the same
law granted a form of monopoly and in so
doing the old rule of caveat emptor is
cast aside. Those dealing with a licensed
broker may naturally assume that he possesses the requisites of an honest, ethical
man. 25 So. Zd at 4-5.
The Florida court recognized that the state statutes create
a higher standard of qualification and competency and that those

dealing with such licensed individuals have the right to rely on
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those high qualifications and accept information given by them as
true.
Oregon has also recognized this duty when the seller's agent
is dealing with the buyer.

In Greig vs. Interstate Investment

Co., 253 P. 877 (1927) where the plaintiff-buyer was dealing
solely with the seller's agent, the court stated that "the evidence tends to show a relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant Ross bordering very closely to being a fiduciary."
facts of Greig are very similar to the present case.

The

In both

cases, the buyer was limited to dealings with the seller's agent
and no one else.

In both cases the buyer had to negotiate with

the seller's agent if he wanted to buy that particular piece of
property.

In both cases a relationship existed that required a

high degree of trust.
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized this duty and has
extended it to brokers with greater experience in land dealings.
In Motter vs. Bateman, 18 Utah 2d 335, 338 (1967) Pac. citation the
court stated:
.We recognize the principle that where there
is a significant disparity of intelligence
or experience by which one party is able to
take advantage of the other, the fact may be
considered.
See also Lewis vs. 1fui te, supra.
In the present case the third-party defendants had been in
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the real estate business for many years and were licensed to
deal in real estate.

(Tr. 86,204)

The Joneses had engaged in

only one purchase of property in Utah, (the Jensen, Utah property) and
were not experienced in land dealings.

The Joneses relied on the United

Farm Agency and Oberhansly's license as being a guarantee of
their honesty and competency.

Because of third-party defendants'

expert knowledge and experience and the Joneses' reliance on this
knowledge and experience, the third-party defendants are estopped
to assert that they had no duty to act in a competent and trustworthy manner. United Farm Agency and Oberhansly are bound by the
statutes and must act in furtherance of the public interest by
conducting all business in a competent and trustworthy manner.
Stilson admits that he owes a duty to the buyers as though the
buyer were the principal of the Agency.

In Stilson's direct

testimony before the Security Commission of the State of Utah
Real Estate Division on Friday December 17, 1976 at 1:00 p.m., he
states on page 72 of the transcript:
. . . We try to work so that we work for
the benefit of our clients and to help our
buyer, we bring them in from long distances,
we try to represent them and do the very
best job that we can~Emphasis added.)
(R.83)

It is clear from Stilson's testimony that he recognizes the duty
that is owing to the buyer and that this duty must be fulfilled.
In the case at bar, United Farm Agency is a nationwide
company which specializes in farm, ranch and recreation property.
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through United Farm Agency in Utah is recreational.
mainly in 5 to 10 acre lots.

This is

(Stilson dep. P.7, L.l-8)

Oberhans~

averages approximately twenty transactions a year on behalf of
United Farm Agency which involve acreage in excess of ten acres.
(Tr. 203)

He took the listing on the subject property on February

11, 1972.

The Joneses did not come to see the property until

over a year later.

(Tr 204).

Oberhansly had in excess of one

year to make a determination as to the accuracy of his representations as to the amount of acreage involved.
specialty is acreage in excess of 10 acres.

Oberhansly's
(Tr. 203)

He

admits he prepared an inaccurate listing from which the advertisement was prepared.

(Tr. 206, 208)

acreage as 22 3/4.

(Def. Ex. 7)

This listing showed the
Oberhansly

admits that it

looked more like 6 acres (Tr. 211) than 22 3/4 acres.

(Tr. 212).

Oberhansly knew that the Joneses would not purchase the
acreage unless a building lot was released.

Oberhansly wrote

them a letter (Def. Ex. 11) stating that a building lot would be
released from the mortgage by Dugan and a second mortgage taken
on that piece of land.

(Tr. 211)

All these actions or inactions

taken by Oberhansly were fraudulent or reckless.
Since United Farms' listings are exclusive (Def. Ex. 7), the
Joneses could only deal with Oberhansly.

This makes Oberhansly's

duty to the Joneses, as laymen, much higher than the duty existing
in a non-exclusive listing situation.

Oberhansly became the
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Joneses only representative in dealing with the Dugans.

This

duty is akin to the fiduciary duty owed the Dugans.
The Utah Supreme Court in Reese vs. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119,
329 P.2d 410 (1948) stated:
. . . the relationship of real estate agent
and client makes the situation quite different. The agent is issued a license and
permitted to hold himself out to the public
as qualified by training and experience to
render a specialized service in the field
of real estate transactions. There rests
upon him the responsibility of honesty in
fairly representing the interests of those
who engage his services, and upon failing
to do so his license may be revoked. Accordingly, persons who entrust their business to such agents are entitled to repose
some degree of confidence that they will
be loyal to such trust and that they will,
with reasonable diligence and in good faith,
represent the interests of their client.
Unless the law demands such standard, instead of being the badge of competence and
integrity it is supposed to be, the license
would serve only as a foil to lure the unsuspecting public into being duped by people
more skilled and experienced in such affairs
than are they, when they would be better off
in taking care of such business for themselves. 329 P.2d 412.
In discussing the fiduciary relationship which arises between the real estate agent and his client, the Supreme Court
stated:
Because of the snecialized service the real
estate broker offers in acting as an agent
for his client, there arises a fiduciary
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relationship between them; it is incumbent
upon him to apply his abilities and knowledge
to the advantage of the man he serves and to
make full disclosure of all facts which his
principal should know in transacting the
business. Failure to discharge such duty with
reasonable diligence and care precludes his
recovery for the service he purports to be
rendering. 329 P.2d at 412.
This duty to the Joneses was breached by Oberhansly's fraudulent or reckless conduct resulting in the Joneses purchasing
property otherwise would not have purchased if the true facts had
been known.

(Tr. 171)

The Joneses were damaged because they

bargained for 22 3/4 acres but received less than seven acres.
Consequently, they were prevented from building a home for at
least three years after the purchase of the property.

(P. Ex. 9)

The Joneses were further damaged in not obtaining a parcel of
land large enough to construct an affiliated campground as they
had intended.
POINT V.
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION WERE PLEAD AND PROVED BY
THE APPELLANTS
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity. Malice,
intent, knowledge and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally.
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The circumstances constituting fraud were stated with particularity in Court I, paragraphs 2 through 10 of Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and later incorporated by reference in the remaining counts of said Amended Counterclaim and
Third-Party Complaint.
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is the same as its
counterpart in the Federal rules.

In Law of Federal Courts,

Wright, Zd Edition, it states:
Rule 9 contains special provisions, which
are largely self-explanatory, as to pleading such matters as capacity, fraud or
other condition of mind, conditions precedent, official document or act, judgment,
time and place, and special damage. Of
these provisions, the only one that has
given any difficulty is Rule 9(b), which
says that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Occasional cases have read this
as if it were in a vacuum, and have given
it a strict application that fails to take
into account the general simplicity of
pleadings contemplated by the rules.
Rule 9(b) must be read in the light of
Rule S(a). While fraud must be particularized, the allegations must be as short,
plain, simple concise, and direct as is
reasonable under the circumstances. If the
allegations of fraud are not sufficiently
particularized, the remedy is not to dismiss the complaint, but to require a more
definite statement or to permit defendant
to ascertain the facts by discovery. In
these special matters, as generally, the
aim of the rules to de-emphasize the pleadings and to try the case on the proofs
must be kept in mind.
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In Moore's Federal Practice, it is stated:
In non-federal matters, of course, the elements of fraud are now determined by state law.
For example, in some states the third element
(scienter) may not be required. Subject to
this qualification, all of these elements
should appear in a well-pleaded averment of
fraud, and in addition 'the circumstances constituting fraud' must be stated with particularity. Normally this means that the
pleader must state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentation, the facts
misrepresented and what was obtained or given
up as a consequence of the fraud.
In Pace vs. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, (1952) the
Utah Supreme Court set out the essential elements of fraud and
misrepresentation:
This being an action in deceit based on
fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden
was upon plaintiffs to prove all of the
essential elements thereof. These are:
(1) That a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false,
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he
had insufficient knowledge upon which to
base such representation; (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to
act upon it; (6) that the other party,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to
his injury and damage.
Pursuant to these requirements, paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of
Count I of the Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (R.
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113) detail the representations made of presently-existing
material facts, that is the amount of acreage and the release of
the acre of ground for the building lot.
were false.

(Tr. 95, 211)

These representations

At the trial, there was no question

that these representations were made or that they were false.
(Tr. 89, 63)
tations.

Dugan and Oberhansly admitted to these represen-

(Tr. 49, 63, 210, 211)

In a land purchase, whether there is 22 3/4 acres or in
reality less than 7 acres is an obvious material fact.

The

Dugans, as testified, have bought and sold large amounts of
acreage in the Vernal area for many years and would know whether
they had almost 23 acres or less than 7 acres, or whether they
had 18 acres tillable or 8 acres irrigated.
Oberhansly has worked the last 8 years as a real estate
agent for a company that specifically specializes in farm, ranch
and recreational property.

The information contained in the

listing and the accompanying national advertisement was given by
him based on representations made by Dugan and his own inspection
of the property.

(Tr. 59, 60, 205)

Oberhansly knew of their falsity or else made them recklessly without sufficient knowledge.
~ew

It is apparent that Oberhansly

that the Dugans had not agreed to release a building lot

from the acreage, yet he said that they had agreed knowing that

the Joneses would not purchase this property without such an
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agreement;

(Tr. 69, 211) therefore, inducing the Joneses to

return the amended Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale, thereby'
going ahead with the purchase.

(Tr. 116 117)

The Joneses were unaware of the falsities of the representations made by Dugan and Oberhansly (Tr. 121, 132) and in fact
relied on them to make their purchase, a purchase which would not
have been made if they had known of any single untrue representation.

(Tr. 101, 108)

A bank appraisal was done on the building on the property as
to their value in 1973 the year of purchase.

(Tr. 193)

Based on

this, Betty Jones testified that the buildings were worth at best
approxiately $12,000.

(Tr. 135)

In subtracting this $12,000 figure from the $50,000 purchase
price, one is left with $38,000 as to the price of the land
purchased.

Dividing it by the 22 3/4 acres contracted to be

sold, a price per acre of $1,670.33 is attained.
Carl Dugan himself, in an attempt to refute the Joneses'
testimony, testified that the acreage without the building should
have been valued at $10,000 by stating the store and other build·
ings were worth $40,000 at the time of the sale.

(Tr. 246)

Even

using this questionable figure, one is given a figure of $1,666.66
price per acre by dividing by the actual acreage figure of 6
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acres which Dugan testified was the amount he knew was conveyed.
(Tr. 37) The unrefuted testimony at trial was that the Joneses
were shorted approximately 16 acres.

At the figure of $1,670.33

per acre, the damage for the missing acreage would be $26,725.28;
even using Dugan's own figures testified at court, the Joneses'
damage for the missing 16 acres is $26,666.56.
CONCLUSION
A party bringing counterclaims and third-party claims raising
factual questions in causes of action traditionally cognizable at

n

law is entitled to a jury trial.

This right to jury trial is

protected by the Constitution of Utah as well as Utah statutes and
judicial decisions.
An oral pre-trial order should not disallow presenting expert
testimony as to the value of property.

Excluding such testimony

constitutes a manifest injustice particularly when the opposing
party presents testimony as to the value of property and no rebuttal testimony is allowed.
An owner of property is competent to testify as to the value of
property.
n

66

Real estate brokers or salesmen owe a duty to buyers.

When

this duty is breached by the fraud, misrepresentation or negligence of the broker or salesman, the broker or salesman is liable
to the buyer.
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The foreclosure ordered by the District Court was improper.
The judgment of the District Court should, therefore, be reversed.
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the District
Court for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of June, 1979.

ent Ho land
H SON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellants
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